

sacrificing the majesty of the masses and the positivity of their practices to the discourses and the illusions of a few dozen 'non-representative' individuals. In the labyrinth of their real and imaginary travels, I simply wanted to follow the thread of two guiding questions: What paradoxical route led these deserters, who wanted to tear themselves free from the constraints of proletarian existence, to come to forge the image and the discourse of working class identity? And what new forms of false construction affect that paradox when the discourse of workers infatuated with the night of the intellectuals meets the discourse of intellectuals infatuated with the glorious working days of the masses? That is a question we should ask ourselves. But it is a question immediately experienced within the contradictory relations between the proletariat of the night and the prophets of the new world - Saint-Simonians, Icarians or whatever. For, if it is indeed the word of 'bourgeois' apostles which creates or deepens a crack in their daily round of work through which some workers are drawn into the twists and turns of another life, the problems begin when the preachers want to change those twists and turns into the true, straight road that leads to the dawn of New Labour. They want to cast their disciples in their identity as good soldiers of the great militant army and as prototypes of the worker of the future. Surely, the Saint-Simonian workers, blissfully listening to these words of love, lose even more of that tough workers' identity that the calling of New Industry requires. And, looking at the matter from the other direction, surely the Icarian proletariat will be able to re-discover that identity only by discrediting the fatherly teachings of their leader.

Perhaps these are so many missed opportunities, dead-ends of a utopian education, where edifying Theory will not long delude itself that it can see the path to self-emancipation beaten out for any proletariat that is instructed in Science. The tortuous arguments of *L'Atelier*, the first great newspaper 'made by the workers themselves', suggest in advance what the agents detailed to spy on the workers' associations which emerged from this twist-

ing path were to discover with surprise: that once he is master of the instruments and the products of his labour, the worker cannot manage to convince himself that he is working 'in his own interest'.

Nonetheless, we should not be too quick to rejoice at recognising the vanity of the path to emancipation in this paradox. We may discover that obstinate initial question with even greater force: What precisely is it that the worker can pursue *in his own interest*? What exactly is at work in the strange attempt to rebuild the world around a centre that the inhabitants only want to escape? And is not *something else* to be gained on these roads that lead nowhere, in these efforts to sustain a fundamental rejection of the order of things, beyond all the constraints of working-class existence? No one will find much to strengthen the grounds of his disillusionment or his bitterness in the paths of these workers who, back in July 1830, swore that nothing would be the same again, or in the contradictions of their relations with the intellectuals who aligned themselves with the masses. The moral of this tale is quite the reverse of the one people like to draw from the wisdom of the masses. It is to some extent the lesson of the impossible, that of the rejection of the established order even in the face of the extinction of Utopia. If, for once, we let the thoughts of those who are not 'destined' to think unfold before us, we may come to recognise that the relationship between the order of the world and the desires of those subjected to it presents more complexity than is grasped by the discourses of the intelligentsia. Perhaps we shall gain a certain modesty in deploying grand words and expressing grand sentiments. Who knows?

In any case, those who venture into this labyrinth must be honestly forewarned that no answers will be supplied.

Translated by Noel Parker*

1 Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Jowett, VI.495.

* With acknowledgement for help and suggestions from Pete Dews, Jonathan Ree, Mike Shortland, Carolyn Sumberg.

Lukas, Heidegger and Fascism

Mark Tebbitt

It has long been acknowledged that there is a necessity to develop a rational Marxist response to 20th-century existentialism. The post-War debates on this subject have almost inevitably tended to focus on the development of Sartre's philosophy, on his dialogues with official Marxism in France, and above all on his dialogue with himself, evolving his own personal interpretation of existential Marxism [1]. The problems arising from these debates have revolved

around the question of the extent to which these two apparently irreconcilable views of the world can be genuinely and fruitfully synthesised. There have been a great number of variations on this theme in post-War France, many of them attempting to broaden the basis of Marxist philosophy [2]. When we turn back to consider the significance of Heidegger's philosophy, however, the problems we are facing are entirely different and much more uncomfortable.

Whereas Sartre spent the latter half of his career in a remorselessly honest attempt to move both politically and philosophically from existentialism to Marxism, Heidegger continued to deepen his philosophy in an explicitly mystical direction and remained an unrepentant adherent to the extreme right.

Many have argued that Heidegger's Nazi affiliation was due to his political naivety and that in any case it had no deep connection with his philosophy. There has been a good point to this argument in as far as it has resisted the crude tendency to dismiss a philosophy on political grounds. It is nevertheless an unconvincing argument. The significance of Heidegger's philosophy - as we shall see - lies precisely in the fact that it was intrinsically but not unambiguously bound up with European fascism. Far from being a reason for dismissing it, this is exactly why it is necessary to penetrate its meaning more deeply. The criticism of Heidegger is of course only a special case in the recent history of equivocation over the question of ascribing responsibility to certain intellectuals for the rise of fascism. In this debate two fundamentally opposed attitudes have prevailed. On the one hand we have seen a widespread tendency towards a moralistic denunciation and scornful ridicule of, for example, Nietzsche's philosophy, focusing on the more obnoxious social ideas, his sexism and contempt for the 'herd' and so on. On the other hand we find the equally strong tendency to play down these aspects, to insist that fascism perverted every text it used, emphasising Nietzsche's ironic role-playing and allegedly profound humanism. Neither has it been uncommon to alternate between these two attitudes, between profound admiration and moral denunciation [3]. There has certainly been much genuine confusion as to which is the 'real' Nietzsche. In other words, more attention has been paid to the subjective intentions of the writers concerned than to the objective meaning of the ideas which had been evolving in the 19th century and which were coming into focus in the 1920s in Heidegger's philosophy.

The approach to Heidegger which I propose to adopt in order to penetrate this confusion and thereby the meaning of his central concepts will certainly seem paradoxical. It is based on the standpoint of Lukács' general philosophical and aesthetic perspective. As is well known, Lukács repeatedly and unequivocally portrayed Heidegger's philosophy as intrinsically irrationalist and fascist [4], and this would seem to leave us in the position of those who dismiss Heidegger out of hand. However, it should become clear that it is only from the point of view of a rigorously objectivistic Marxism that Heidegger's real meaning and importance can be drawn out. If we place Heidegger's philosophy in the context of that of Lukács, we can show that it is deeply personal and obscurantist in appearance only, and we can also develop a more clear picture of the real choices and conflicts of the 1920s which have not yet been resolved. In so doing, we can at the same time bring forward some ideas which are lying just beneath the surface of contemporary philosophical debates.

To establish the framework of this analysis we need to make a number of - admittedly controversial - presuppositions concerning the nature and development of Lukács' philosophy. The most important one is that after approximately 1918 there is an essential theoretical continuity - notwithstanding the appearance of a radical and abrupt departure - between the early and the latest works. This continuity is manifested primarily in Lukács' consistently rationalist approach to the phenomenon of reification, and it exists to the extent that we can refer to his philosophy as a whole - not just *History and Class Consciousness* - as 'a theory of reification'.

Secondly, it is important to understand that this theory is not an idiosyncratic synthesis of Marx and Weber and thereby a form of original 'revisionism' [5]. What Lukács' theory constitutes throughout is a fundamentally objectivistic reading of Marxist philosophy and aesthetics. It is not a relativistic critique of Soviet philosophical orthodoxy, but on the contrary is a progressive deepening of the Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism, an attempted realisation of what has been formalised by the rigorous interpretation and enforcement of this philosophy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thirdly, and following from this, the theory constitutes an unqualified defence of the achievements of natural science, rationalist philosophy and realist literature, simultaneously on the basis of an unqualified rejection of positivism, formal rationalism and naturalistic realism. If this interpretation runs sharply against the grain of the more familiar interpretations of *History and Class Consciousness* as Lukács' last burst of youthful idealism, as an outstanding romantic expression of German *Lebensphilosophie* and anti-scientism, it is because this interpretation has largely been due to the tendency to blur the distinction between dialectical and formal rationalism [6]. Finally, the presupposition regarding the internal development of the theory is that it constitutes not a volte-face but a natural advance or qualitative leap from a rigorously objective provisional (and incipiently materialist) idealism to a thoroughgoing (dialectical) materialism. Through the course of this development, the relevant aspects of the theory of reification which we shall now consider remain essentially unchanged.

In 1923 Lukács' project of an explicit and elaborate definition and history of the phenomenon of reification was abruptly cut short by the hostile reaction from the official Communist movement to the publication of *History and Class Consciousness* [7]. This project nevertheless remained as the theoretical basis of all of Lukács' subsequent writings. It provided the framework for his systematic analysis of the history of modern philosophy and literature and for his extensive criticism of contemporary literature. What this project involved was the development of a definition of the phenomenon of reification, an identification of its historical and cultural origins, and a number of proposals concerning an appropriate response to this phenomenon. Reification is defined essentially as a universal *formalism*, at first afflicting and eventually dominating and pervading modern thought. Its historical origins are precisely located in the material process of production, in the beginning of the production of commodities primarily for exchange. The proposed response to this formalism *in thought* is based on a defence and expansion of modern rationalism, i.e. on the emergence of a wider rationality [8]. What we are concerned with first here is the definition of reification.

The concepts which appear most prominently in the central chapter on reification [9] are those which we normally associate with vaguely humanist or vitalist critiques of 'the modern way of life'. The *rationalisation* which extends from the technological requirements of industry through every aspect of our lives is the most striking example. Lukács' descriptions of the dehumanising effects of the ever-increasing *mechanisation* of industry on society at large, suggesting an existential nightmare in the modern factories and offices, are not exactly original. Neither are the ideas that follow from his observation of the process of rationalisation: the de-vitalising reduction of quality to quantity and mathematical series; the elevation of the principles of precise calculability and objective systematisation

to deal with all problems, etc. etc. [10]. It is often assumed that this was the last expression of Lukács' 'romantic' period, a revival of the German romanticist reaction against the soul-less enlightenment which accompanied the rise of science and capitalism. Similarly, it is regarded as an essentially irrationalist attempt to shift Marxism away from science on to a loosely based sentiment of opposition to the conditions created by modern industry. This interpretation is in fact a complete falsification of the argument at the heart of the book, and it has only been sustained by a failure to recognise the dialectical movement of this argument. This movement consists in the fact that Lukács entertains subjective possibilities in order to move more deeply to the objective heart of the matter. The above-mentioned subjective elements are indeed introduced - as they must be; they can hardly be denied - but they are by no means the substance of the argument. In fact the most substantial and controversial thesis which Lukács is putting forward in this chapter - and throughout the book - is that a subjectively revolutionary critique of capitalism which remains on the level of a merely negative value-judgement, a condemnation of the inhumanity of imperialism, is objectively as effective a consecration of the existing order as an explicitly reactionary defence of it. Furthermore this criticism is not restricted to the most excessively subjectivist political philosophies with tendencies towards a tragic resignation, but is extended to every critique of capitalism which remains trapped in the reified categories of thought [11]. What we find behind this thesis is the constant assumption that it is necessary to articulate a deeper conception of objectivity in order to change reality and to outface the profound subjectivity of irrationalism. Far from playing with irrationalism himself, Lukács is continually upbraiding formal (bourgeois) rationalism for its failure to recognise, comprehend and outface irrationalism, and to deal with the problem of the irrational itself [12]. Hence the central importance of the concepts of rationalisation and mechanisation is that as material processes in the development of capitalist industry they have automatically generated formal (reified) patterns of thought, which are characterised as quantification, precise calculability, separation of form and content, etc. (It is the real life-process that determines [the reified] consciousness.) He is arguing that the mechanical and formally rationalistic modes of thought which have thus become predominant, producing causal determinism, mechanical materialism etc., are inherently incapable of even understanding the problem of irrationality. What is important to Lukács' theory is not the idea of an anguished protest against capitalist dehumanisation, but rather the strictly objective historical thesis that human consciousness has been radically restructured and constricted; that something has literally happened not only to the 'modern way of life' and the conditions of production, but also to the way in which we think (our 'consciousness') over an exactly identifiable historical period. The primary ideological results of this development are the increasing formalisation of reason and perception, giving rise to formal rationalism and a constricted empiricism, and thereby a progressive distancing of thought and perception from the real world. The effect of this formalisation is not only to conceal and distort the real nature of social relations, but also to conceal and distort both objective material reality as such ('the character of things as things') [13] and its subjective component, the human reality. In the most general terms, then, this is the objective situation as Lukács sees it in the 1920s. Broadly

speaking, the phenomenon of reification is understood as the formalisation of life and thought.

The wider context

When understood in this manner it is clear that the *concept* of reification, even if it is not referred to as such, is by no means confined to Lukács' philosophy. Apart from its explicit sources in Marx and Weber it can be used to designate a very broad tendency in modern philosophy and imaginative literature. As we shall see, however, Lukács' theory is clearly distinguished from, and even fundamentally opposed to most expressions of this tendency. Nevertheless, if we grasp the scope of the general context in which these initial resemblances appear, we can begin to understand the connection between the philosophies of Heidegger and Lukács.

Despite Heidegger's partly successful attempt to break out of the tradition of Western philosophy and to reformulate its questions, he can be fairly defined in terms of a number of philosophical traditions. On the basis of a secularisation of Kierkegaard's highly unorthodox protestant theology and a development of Nietzsche's attack on modern science, rationalism and ethics, Heidegger evolved the first systematic expression of what has come to be known as 20th-century *existentialism*. Secondly, he transformed Husserl's purportedly scientific *phenomenology* into a method for directly disclosing (intuiting) the essence of reality, the things in themselves which modern bourgeois philosophy since Kant has regarded as inaccessible. Thirdly, Heidegger's philosophy as a whole can be seen as an advanced stage of the development of 20th-century vitalism (*Lebensphilosophie*), turning it to focus on the mood of despair.

However, it is quite illuminating to bear in mind the fact that Heidegger, like most people, was also responding to not strictly philosophical influences. In 1927 he replied to Lukács in somewhat sarcastic vein that reification was not exactly an unknown phenomenon:

It has long been known that past ontology works with 'Thing-concepts' and that there is a danger of 'reifying consciousness'. But what does this 'reifying' signify? Where does it arise? ... Why does this reifying keep coming back to exercise its dominion? What *positive* structure does the Being of 'consciousness' have, if reification remains inappropriate to it? [14]

The general awareness to which Heidegger is referring existed far beyond the bounds of academic philosophy. We need only mention here that the influence of Nietzsche on the literary and visual arts was far more extensive than his influence on philosophy. The impact of the modernist upheaval in the arts on both Lukács and Heidegger was probably as great as any development in philosophy at the time. This upheaval was essentially a violent reaction to the formalisation of the intellect and the imagination imposed by the straitjacket of naturalistic realism. The defiant disruption of all customary and habitual modes and channels of thought and perception was a symptom of the tangibly oppressive weight of reification, of the mechanical and rationalised view of the world. The belief in a *reality* - whether of the external world or of a deeper subjective dimension - which is obscured by the surface, by the conscious mind, is in itself an indication of the phenomenon of reification as both Lukács and Heidegger understood it: a formalisation, a distancing of thought and perception from the real world. The consciously compulsive and almost invariably frustrated search for the real, to grasp the evasive essence of reality, is an almost universal characteristic of

modernism. In this context it is not surprising that Heidegger points out that this is a well-known phenomenon, and that the important questions relate to its significance, why it is there and why it seems to be irremovable. As I have already suggested, Lukács has more convincing answers than Heidegger to these questions.

The question of theology

Before we turn to their respective responses to the phenomenon of reification, we should briefly consider the theological interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy. Roger Waterhouse has put forward a highly plausible case for such an interpretation, and has argued that Heidegger's later philosophy is a logical development of *Being and Time* [15]. He has argued that Heidegger was engaged in a lifelong theistic project of putting theology on to a sound basis; that 'Being' is a quasi-religious concept equivalent to 'God', and that in listening to 'the call of Being' Heidegger was attuning himself, in the same manner as the explicit theologians Bultmann and Buber, to the voice of God, to the end of achieving a direct relationship with God. There is strong evidence for this interpretation: not only is Heidegger constantly alluding to the writings of St. Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal etc. [16], but the language in which he conducts the whole investigation of Being is permeated with theological connotations: the inner conscience, the human Fall, ineradicable guilt and so on.

There are certain advantages to this interpretation. On the one hand it draws attention to the fact that Heidegger was responding to a *spiritual* crisis in Western Europe, and that he was less concerned with 'the world' as normally understood than with phenomena which are for the most part completely hidden from view. It also indicates that he was primarily concerned with the possibility of personal salvation. But on the other hand, the theological interpretation of Heidegger tends to draw our attention *away* from the real significance of his philosophy. In the first place, if we regard ourselves as atheists we feel *safer* when we can label a philosophy 'mystical' or 'theological' from the outset: we can comfortably think of it as 'that load of rubbish' before we start [17]. Secondly, this interpretation can prevent us from recognising the startling accuracy of many of Heidegger's phenomenological descriptions of contemporary states of mind, if we are thinking about their religious connotations.

Far more importantly, however, I suggest that this interpretation is fundamentally mistaken, and that we should take Heidegger's disavowal of a theological concern at face value [18]. He expresses no belief in either the existence of God or in any form of life beyond death. His belief in the finality of death is not only settled and explicit, it is the very basis of his philosophy. 'Nothingness' means what it says. It is one of Heidegger's central themes that the call of being has been constantly misunderstood through the ages as the voice of God. Consequently Heidegger's preoccupation with the history of theology is based on his belief that the full realisation of atheism depends upon a relentless dialogue with theology, rooting its hidden presence out of our view of the world. 'Being' is not equivalent to 'God', but on the contrary the experience of it is the profoundly alarming experience of the absence of God. Heidegger regards the doctrinal disputes in traditional theology as distorted expressions of the conflicts of beliefs concerning the relationship of human consciousness to terrestrial reality (Being). The 'loss of Being' is precisely this distance

between awareness and reality: he is seeking to draw us back, not to an immediate relation with God, but to a direct awareness of the real. He is searching for personal salvation, not from eternal damnation, but from the hell of empirical reality, of being perpetually caught in appearances. The only way in which it makes any sense to describe such a philosophy as theological is paradoxical: an atheistic 'theology' based on an understanding of the panic-stricken consequences of the disappearance of God from our mental framework, in the 'Death of God' tradition initiated by Nietzsche. We can consistently argue - without in any sense defending religion - that it is partly the reckless nature of this *attack* on theology which links Heidegger's philosophy so closely with Fascism. In the Nietzschean tradition it is a deliberate promulgation of a radical despair, induced by the declaration that the human world, in going beyond religious belief, has irrevocably lost its centre of gravity. His attempt to resolve this despair is doomed from the outset because - as we shall see - he has decisively rejected the principles of rationalism.

Das Man

The concept at the heart of Heidegger's philosophy is the one which has caused the most difficulty and confusion in interpretation, not least because of the translation problem. But a genuine understanding of any of the central concepts depends upon a clarification of the concept of *Das Man*. If this remains in the dark, so also will the general significance of Heidegger's probing into the meaning of time, and his search for a deeper conception of subjectivity. So what does it mean?

The long-term project envisaged in the introduction to *Being and Time* was a concrete analysis of the different ways in which *time* can be experienced [19]. The published text was only a preliminary opening for this project, which was never itself realised. The preparatory analysis of *Dasein* (the human reality; literally: being-there), however, does already revolve around the time factor, even where this is not explicit. A searching analysis of the phenomenon of time was to become the central project because the normal, unreflective and automatic manner in which we experience this phenomenon, Heidegger maintained, is closely connected with the equally unreflective manner in which we accept the reality of appearances in general. In particular, our normal conception of time has the effect of repressing our awareness of different modes of subjectivity and of establishing a universal mode, that of *Das Man*, which in this passage is translated as 'the Others' and as 'the they':

Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to Others. It itself *is* not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. *Dasein*'s everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not *definite* Others. On the contrary, *any* other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from *Dasein* as Being-with. *One belongs to the Others oneself* and enhances their power ... The 'who' (of *Dasein*) is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, *the they*. [20]

A number of interpretations of *Das Man* immediately present themselves. On a superficial level we can submit to the translation problem, regard it as a dark and esoteric concept, and remain mystified as

to its deeper meaning. Secondly, it is easy to imagine *Das Man* being spoken in a deeply contemptuous tone of voice, and to regard it as a nauseatingly elitist hatred of the mediocrity of the masses. Alternatively, these passages can be read as expressions of acute paranoia - the isolated individual always persecuted by 'the others', by 'them'. From another point of view, it can be interpreted as implying a positive critique of repressive social arrangements from an individualist point of view.

There is certainly an element of truth in such interpretations, but they tend to divert attention from the central issue: the enforcement of a universal mode of subjectivity which actively but inconspicuously represses every other mode. This pervading consciousness, then, the consciousness of *Das Man*, can be expressed as that of an abstract collective - for which no individual is responsible - which swallows and represses every individual, and generates a false conception of the individual in its own image. To express this in terms with which we are already familiar from Lukács' theory: the group consciousness standing beyond the pale shadow of the apparently free individual provides the system of mechanisms which sets up barriers to prevent individual thought from escaping its prescribed limits, from penetrating the world of reification and discovering the real world. This collective mode of subjectivity is the result of the formalisation of consciousness; *Das Man* is *us*: it represents the formal and abstract way in which *we* think in a reified culture. In this sense, *Das Man* is bourgeois man, who falls back against traditional (bourgeois, 'reified') forms of thought, and in so doing falls back against 'the world'.

As I have suggested, the truth of this is only brought home by the recognition of the *time* factor. This process of formalisation has *already* been completed. The past tense is crucial. In Heidegger's philosophy the being of the individual 'has (*already*) been taken away by the Others'. It is something which has already literally happened. In Lukács' theory, the reification of consciousness is something that has already happened, it is a socially established fact. For both Lukács and Heidegger (Marxism and Fascism) the distance between consciousness and reality is a firmly established fact, and this is only possible because the awareness of this distance is repressed.

The crisis of subjectivity

If our normal conception of time is responsible for concealing the undeniable historical fact that the formal way of thinking (the reified consciousness) is not the only way, then it is evident that a serious examination of our normal conception of time will at least reveal the possibility of other ways of thinking, of other modes of consciousness. If we focus our attention on the meaning of Heidegger's existentialist expression of *individualism*, we can cast further light on the connection between this changing awareness and our changing conception of time.

It is common knowledge that existentialism is an extreme form of 'individualism', but it is not always acknowledged that it bears virtually no resemblance to the traditional liberal defence of the individual [21]. From the point of view of either Marxism or existentialism, the formal declarations of the constitutional rights of the individual are usually regarded as at best merely abstract and ineffective, and at worst as sanctimonious and hypocritical drivel. It is not, however, merely a question of a failure to put into practice what is guaranteed on paper; the

existentialist conception of the individual is radically at odds with the typically liberal expression of it.

If we look again at the wider cultural background upon which Heidegger was drawing in his articulation of the relationship between the individual and the collective, we can see how profoundly his conception of the individual differed from the liberal conception. Classic liberal theory revolves around the elaborate definition of the area of individual freedom which should be defended against the claims of the state. The liberal defence of individual human rights, then, is based on the idea of *a defence of the existing individual* in society. This is the first - apparently sane and obvious - conception of subjectivity with which we are concerned. It requires something of a leap of imagination to grasp the motivation behind the widespread and violent rebellion against reification and with it this conception of subjectivity, in the early decades of the century [22].

On the basis of this most commonplace and immediately obvious conception of subjectivity, oppression and violence are quite visible and clear-cut: 'the individual' is protected from the (predominantly physical) arbitrariness of the state. From the point of view of the new mood which was arising, however, the focus was shifting from explicit to hidden violence, the emphasis was moving from open oppression by the state to the less visible and less tangible oppression of individuals by the social collective at large. From this point of view it was making increasingly less sense to speak of 'the defence of the individual', when it was the very identity of the individual which was in question. The commonplace assumption that was being challenged was that, despite the overbearing claims of the collective, individuals had retained their integrity, that there was still something there to be defended. So the sensible conception of subjectivity which is automatically generated by reification is based on the assumption that the empirical ego which shows its face to the world is co-extensive with the 'real subject'.

The typically modernist 'subjectivism', then, is only superficially explicable as a reaction against the corrupt and shallow cynicism of the world of parliamentary politics or the manipulative world of the spreading bureaucracy, or even as a rejection of the cash-orientated philistinism of the artistic establishment. It ran deeper than this in its attempt to apprehend a more real mode of subjectivity which is concealed by the one-dimensional conception of the empirical ego. A sceptical response to this conception - and the corresponding assertion of a hidden subjectivity - is clearly connected with an unusually developed sense of the passage of *time*. On the first conception, the interests of the individual have to be balanced with those of the collective. It is acknowledged that the collective presents a threat to the freedom of the individual, and its area of integrity is defined to resist the threat. On the *second* conception, a slight shift of emphasis reveals an entirely different situation. The question is no longer an abstract and ahistorical one if we see the subjectivity of the individual, not as 'being threatened', but rather as *already being* in the process of being crushed or eliminated, *already* in the process of capitulating to the pressure, to the oppressive weight of the collective. If this is the case, something has been lost already, it is not in danger of being lost. The relation between the individual and the collective is seen to be a historically changing one. Consequently the general question is reversed from one of a defence of indiv-

individual rights to that of a potentially aggressive assertion of already violated rights, a movement to resist the crushing of the individual, a struggle to re-appropriate personal space from *Das Man*, the anonymous collective.

This was the essential atmosphere of the crisis of subjectivity which was taking on alarming proportions in the expression of a growing ontological insecurity with respect to the substantiality of the human subject. But the crisis went much deeper than this, and so of course did Heidegger's philosophy. Within the consciousness of this crisis there was a further shift away from the conventional conception of the subject, and a *third* distinct conception of subjectivity begins to emerge, which undermines the first and second conceptions even more radically. Yet the third is already implicit in the second.

If we take up the point of view of 'the real individual' behind the mask which it presents to the world, society increasingly takes on the aspect of a conspiratorial organisation for the suppression of originality and novelty, and for the enforcement of its own norms of averageness, and this repression is seen as the essential feature of the entire culture:

Being-with-one-another concerns itself as such with *averageness*, which is an existential characteristic of the 'they'... In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of *Dasein* which we call the 'levelling down' of all possibilities of Being ... etc ... etc ... [23]

The new tragic individualism, from Nietzsche to Heidegger, was based on this perception of the enforcement of averageness, of the quiet de-fusion of ideas which run against the grain, 'the grain' being the ideas implanted by reification. As we have seen, the fear that this enforcement engendered was that the real individual was literally in danger of being obliterated by the collective. The next stage of development of this crisis is an entirely logical one, but it opens up a profoundly alien dimension of subjectivity which cannot possibly be absorbed by any conception of reason. This transition occurs when the fear of the obliteration of the real individual by the collective gives way to a deeper fear, which is constituted by the dawning realisation that this is not merely in the process of happening, but that perhaps it has *already* happened, the process has been completed. If this is the case, that the individual subject has already been displaced by a collective subject (*Das Man*), and has itself entirely disappeared then the individual is already thinking the thoughts of the collective, or the collective is thinking *through* the individual.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger is making the assumption that this displacement has long since occurred. Over the course of the analysis he attempts to demonstrate the transitions of consciousness from the first to the second, and then to the third conceptions of individual subjectivity, as outlined above. His central concern is with achieving and maintaining the second transition in order to reveal directly the existence of an entirely forgotten dimension of subjectivity. The consequences of the first transition are unnerving, but those of this second shift are almost immeasurable. Here we can

only indicate the implications in general terms.

The initial shift of emphasis from open to covert oppression by the collective leads to an urgent sense of historical movement and a deeply critical awareness of the repressive features of bourgeois society. But in order to go beyond this and penetrate the truly subjective dimension, we would have to move into a world which is experienced as timeless (or, more precisely, to cultivate an awareness which is not conscious of the passage of time), a world in which history is a trivial irrelevance. A sense of history - and hence of *reality* - gives way to an obsession with the meaning of time. Secondly, the political implications of focusing on this 'timeless' dimension are ambiguous. In the world as we know it - either in its static appearance or its historical reality - the struggles by individuals to resist oppression are seen from the 'timeless' point of view as illusions, because the 'individuals' themselves are no more than homogeneous interconnected fragments of *Das Man*, encountering and speaking to one another with one voice, in an entirely mechanical universe. (If anyone speaks against this voice, s/he is experienced as 'odd', 'weird' or 'insane', depending on the volume of the voice of the real individual making itself heard.) Any resistance to *Das Man* is apparently futile. But Heidegger's position is not politically quietistic; it was this democratic tyranny which the Nazis were determined to destroy.

Thirdly, these changing conceptions of the individual subject have far-reaching psychological implications. With the development of the crisis of subjectivity the individual fear of the collective completely changes its nature. From the familiar apprehension of others as representing a limitation to one's individual freedom, it initially develops into a relatively unambiguous fear which is essentially *claustrophobic*, with the individual constantly experiencing the other(s) as a threat and facing invasions of its own personal space [24]. But with the second transition which Heidegger is making, this permanent 'crisis-consciousness' is transformed into a drastic identity crisis, the extremity of which is manifested as a bewildered confusion as to the direction from which the threat is coming. The initially unambiguous threat from the others (*Das Man*) becomes a threat from oneself as one of the others (*Das Man* has already invaded the self: 'one belongs to the others oneself and enhances their power'), and a threat from the emerging hidden self *against* the others. The cleavage between the self and the others becomes a cleavage within the subject itself. If from this point of development the identity crisis (am I myself or one of the others?) is resolved by focusing on the threat posed by the erupting inner self, the fear is transformed from a relatively healthy and 'rational' paranoia into an anxiety (the object of which is not in the world) in the face of the appearance of an entirely alien presence: the inner self. Such an experience is undoubtedly to be understood as psychotic, even if, to the person undergoing it, it is more real than anything previously experienced. Heidegger, of course, is not deterred by the alien nature of the inner subject, but on the contrary is encouraged by it and presses forward to analyse the subject in its own subjectivity (or 'the unexpressed ontological foundations of the "cogito sum"' [25]), beyond the voice of *Das Man*, allowing the alien presence to make itself felt, and describing the way in which its usually hidden presence determines the structures of everyday thought, language and behaviour. Heidegger is only able to embark on this project when he has established the transition from the second conception of subjectivity (the subject against the others) to

the third (the subject divided against itself). With this transition, the meaning of *Das Man* changes accordingly: it becomes more than a tangible and menacing presence, a threatening distortion of human potentiality, it becomes the human race as such. Heidegger's continued search for the real subject can thus be seen as explicitly anti-humanist in character.

To summarise briefly at this point: what we have understood as the crisis of subjectivity in the early modernist period is essentially a radical rejection of the everyday conception of the human individual. This 'subjectivism' develops from a profoundly critical expression of relativism into a chaotic nihilism, from the point of view of which the real world becomes completely insubstantial and inconsequential. When we look at a development like this, there is a strong tendency to regard it as initially positive and enlightened, until it takes the dark turn inwards. We should not forget, then, that it is the *first* stage of this development which is already linked closely with fascism. The danger to 'the real individual' is represented by the all-consuming demands of the shallow collective, the process of democratisation from the principles of the French Revolution through to 20th-century social-democracy and communism. It is only from the standpoint of a Marxist analysis that the constricted nature of relativism becomes apparent.

Dialectical reason against irrationalism

If we return now to consider the essential principles of Lukács' overall perspective, we can clarify the main points of a Marxist criticism of Heidegger's existentialism. The starting-point of Lukács' theoretical analysis from 1918 onwards is the phenomenon of *crisis* in the capitalist economy, and its manifestations in every area of social life. At the heart of his philosophy there is a very simple and sound idea concerning the nature of the social and intellectual crisis which was developing in the early years of the 20th century. This was based on the observation that there was a spreading dissolution of the ability and will to comprehend the social and natural reality of the modern world, despite constantly renewed efforts to do so. In any revolutionary age, he points out, there is a three-way tension between the increasingly unconvincing defence of the old synthesis, the elements of disintegration of this synthesis, and the attempt to find a new synthesis.

It is the significance of this three-way tension which is drawn out in the argument in the central chapter of *History and Class Consciousness*. The argument revolves around the problem of irrationality. As I pointed out earlier, Lukács stands unequivocally in the rationalist camp, speaking simultaneously against irrationalism and formal rationalism. In the opening section [26] he describes the immediate situation in the early 1920s: the dehumanised society which is the end-product of the historical process of capitalist rationalisation, now faced with the manifestation of the hitherto concealed problem of irrationality, with the sudden eruption of crisis. He emphasises the impact of the crisis on every level of thought: the 'laws' of the formally closed systems of the sciences fail to function, and the expected patterns disappear in the chaos, which is experienced in the daily life of bourgeois society as 'a sudden dislocation of mundane reality' [27]: the qualitative existence of 'things' suddenly appears. The capacity for rational prediction and organisation is reduced to a paralysed impotence. Lukács acknowledges the bourgeois attempts to construct a philosophical

synthesis to integrate the special sciences, to comprehend reality as a whole and hence to overcome the problem of irrationality, but points out that this would imply 'an inwardly synthesising philosophical method' (i.e. a dialectical method) [28], which would immediately point beyond formal rationalism and bourgeois society. It would mean among other things the abandonment of the separation of the sciences which is essential to the reified consciousness.

In the second section [29], the irrationality of the crisis is set in the context of the historical development of the philosophical attempts - from Descartes to Hegel - to systematically and thoroughly deal with 'the problem of irrationality', to impose reason on reality and consolidate the achievements of the scientific revolution [30]. Lukács' gradual clarification of the essential themes of this immensely complex process of rational enlightenment is itself too complex to repeat here. The point that is most relevant to this discussion is that in the intellectual struggles against the religious, mystical, superstitious and magical modes of thought of the Middle Ages, the crucial transition in this process came about with the (humanist) hypothesis that the world would make deeper sense if we were to assume that it had no independent existence, that reality is the product of mind, that the objects must conform to the subject, rather than vice versa. Hence our 'rational' forms which were derived from the principles of mathematics were to be seen as inherent in the objects themselves [31]. This deliberately *idealist* assumption involved the adoption of an imaginary point of view from which we were able to see reality as rational. The assumption that the phenomena which conflict with the categories of reason do not exist is obviously strictly speaking untrue, but it has been a highly effective means of advancing our knowledge of the phenomena. This explicit inversion of subject and object was the theoretical basis of the humanisation of the world, and as such was the essential condition of overthrowing a world-view essentially based on transcendental explanations of the world, i.e. explanations from a point outside the immanent development of the world. The central importance of this theoretical development - the inversion of subject and object - derives from the fact that it was only made by the scientists and philosophers in accordance with the same transition in the *general consciousness* of society. The growing rationalist belief that there is no breach in the natural order of things was a direct result of the development of industry, not of abstract ideas. When the results of this inversion were seen to be so rational and advantageous, its initially hypothetical nature was rapidly forgotten, not least because the new point of view clearly *was* closer to the truth (the structure of material reality) than the ousted point of view which had not subordinated the objects to the categories of formal reason. This then was the point of view upon which the bourgeois comprehension and rationalisation of the phenomena was based when it was still an increasingly confident rising class. With the apparently firm establishment and extension of the 'rationalist' view of the world, the bourgeoisie was still able to naively equate its own forms with the world as such. It seemed inconceivable that this 'rationalism' could ever be threatened. The problem of the irrational, however, persisted underground so to speak, and with the advance of effective rationalisation it was becoming increasingly difficult to even perceive [32]. Briefly, what it constituted was the problem of the persistent existence of the *content* of the rational forms (which were seen as reality as

such) and consequently the problem of comprehending reality as a *whole* (as a form-content complex). Those philosophers who did perceive and respond to the persistence of the problem initiated 'a parting of the ways in modern philosophy' [33]. Lukács illustrates this development with a quote from Fichte which he repeats several times, as capturing the essence of the problem:

What is at issue is the absolute projection of an object of the origin of which no account can be given, with the result that the space between projection and thing projected is dark and void; I expressed it somewhat scholastically but, as I believe, very appropriately, as the *projectio per hiatus irrationalem*. [34]

This image of a dark and empty chasm opening up between subject and object is an expression of the recognition that the categories of formal reason do not 'fit' reality, that they cannot be successfully imposed upon it. Consequently, the parting of the ways in modern philosophy consisted in the split between dialectical and formal thought. On the one hand, the continued recognition of the precariousness of modern rationalism and hence of the humanisation of the world led to a series of attempts to change the point of view *again*, to find a position from which the 'opening chasm' disappeared, from which reality would appear rational again. On the other hand, the apparent disappearance of the problem of irrationality led to an increasing formalism and the renunciation of any kind of 'metaphysics', from which point of view the problem could not even be recognised.

The rejection of formal rationalism and the search for the new rational standpoint is the subject of the rest of Lukács' analysis, and its focus moves gradually forward again to the inevitable manifestation of irrationality breaking through the formal systems of rational 'laws' in the crisis of the 1920s. In one sweeping movement he lays the philosophical basis for the genuine resolution of this crisis by revealing the essential transition from the ultimate failure of the ingenious attempts of the dialectical bourgeois thinkers (in particular, Schiller, Goethe, Fichte and Hegel) to find the new point of view, to Marx and Engels' grasp of this new synthesis, to the potentially revolutionary consciousness of the rising proletarian class. The very awareness of the proletariat had to be based on this new point of view: if it was to defeat the bourgeoisie it had to be in possession of a wider rationality than that of formal bourgeois rationalism. (Zinoviev was not amused.) As the problem of the irrational (the opening chasm between subject and object) persisted because of the discrepancy between the 'rational' forms and the reality which they were supposed to explain, a new conception of form and thus a new conception of the subject had to be articulated. For the dialectical philosophers who perceived the nature of the problem, there was clearly no question of reversing the subject-object inversion and submitting again to appearances and thus to irrationalism. The new point of view had to be based on the realisation of the formal subject (which had been progressively de-humanised and formalised in the process of rationalisation), a point of view from which reality as a whole could be seen as a continuously integrated immanent development: i.e. inheriting and transforming the principles of bourgeois rationalism. The commitment to rationalism in this whole movement is settled and explicit. This was nothing other than the provisionally idealist basis of a genuine (dialectical) materialism, in the same sense that the Kantian idealism was only a preliminary to a partially successful (mechanical) materialism.

In the third and longest section [35], Lukács

attempts to articulate the new standpoint of the proletariat, the new synthesis which was in the process of emerging. We need hardly go over this as it constitutes the familiar ground of the basic principles of dialectical materialism. But it is in fact the most condensed section of the book, releasing a flood of ideas which Lukács was clearly not able to control. In retrospect, he described it as a fantastic project, and attempt to 'out-Hegel Hegel', a mythologising of the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history [36]. His analysis here was based on the optimistic assumption that the revolutionary transformation of consciousness - analogous to the one which had enabled the bourgeoisie to establish formal rationalism and consolidate its social position - was already taking place and therefore that the process of dissolution of the fixed categories of reification was irreversible. Most of the ideas contained in this section were nevertheless consolidated and incorporated into Lukács' later philosophy. It is only important in this context to point out that the analysis continues to revolve around the problem of irrationality as manifested in crisis, and that in order to comprehend reality as a whole, it was essential to abandon the (bourgeois) standpoint of the immediate experience of reality, which was the basis of the principles of formal rationalism.

Heidegger's irrationalism

What concerns us here is the relevance of the above argument to Heidegger's philosophy. If it is true, as Lukács later argued [37], that Heidegger was not only subjectively aligned to the extreme right, but also that his philosophy objectively represented the most reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie in the 1920s, we have to show how his philosophy stands in relation to formal rationalism.

Throughout *Being and Time* Heidegger repeatedly defends the deeply objective nature of the phenomenological method, which he claims is based on a strict neutrality which allows the phenomena to show themselves as such. In the introduction he acknowledges - as does Lukács - the contemporary 'freshly awakened tendencies' in the formal and specialised sciences to exhibit reality as it is in itself [38]. It seems, on the face of it, to be an analogous project: to reveal the content of the forms which the 'rationalist' forms have obscured. The distinction of course is fundamental: Heidegger, unlike Lukács, is arguing that reason as such is incapable of penetrating the real.

There is a substantial sense, however, in which Heidegger's claim to objectivity is justified. It should be clear from our earlier description of the logic with which the progressively deeper dimensions of subjectivity are revealed is a very real logic, rooted in experience rather than in mere form. The systematic manner in which he penetrates these dimensions is absolutely remorseless, and it represents a serious challenge to the formalism of more conventional bourgeois thought. What he actually demonstrates most effectively is the rare ability to transform 'merely subjective' ideas into alarmingly *real* images. He draws together into a remarkable synthesis the scattered imaginative insights of modernist literature and presents a lucid and *literal* expression of their typical themes; the sense of wonder over the passage of time and the apprehension of a timeless dimension, the feelings of human insubstantiality, homelessness and alienation in the world are expressed not merely as 'very real' experiences, but as alternative ways of looking at the world, as *real possibilities*.

This *intuitive* insight, however, cannot be regarded as genuinely objective. The psychological impact of relativism is entirely dependent upon it being held in contrast to a fixed and shallow conception of objectivity. The recognition that the adoption of different points of view can change the structure of reality, that the act of perception structures its object, is only the first step in the dialectical movement towards the real structure of material reality. Relativism only takes this first step and precludes the possibility of finding objective reality, because it presupposes the equal validity of every point of view. Hence the deeply unfamiliar points of view which we have seen Heidegger adopting in order to see the world in the light of anxiety, destroying the serene consciousness of modern rationalism, are invalid not because they are unfamiliar but because he makes this relativist presupposition and *a priori* abandons the search for objective reality. Hence he is not even *looking* for the new point of view from which we could see reality as a rationally interconnected whole.

When we look at Heidegger's philosophy in the light of the historical development of the problem of irrationality as outlined by Lukács, we can see its objective significance as a stage in the development of irrationalism. A number of points of criticism have been made concerning the irrationalist character of Heidegger's philosophy.

1. It is based on *intuition*, an intuitive leap into 'the centre of reality'. The truth is discovered through the immediacy of 'sheer sensory perception' [39]. Criticisms of intuitionist theories from the point of view of formal rationalism are unconvincing because they tend to either deny that there is a problem (there is no deeper reality to be intuited) or declare it to be insoluble (the deeper reality cannot be known). From a genuinely rational standpoint, Heidegger's intuitive method is criticised because it uncovers only subjective realities and obscures the real world which can only be discovered through the mediation of rational categories, on the basis of a new point of view.

2. It is a *vitalist* expression of 'the real life' of the subject. Again, criticisms of vitalism are usually manifested in one way or another as a denial of the problem. Lukács acknowledges the problem as a central one but focuses the question of the realisation of the subject on social relations, not on the inner sphere of the individual.

3. The central criticism relates to Heidegger's response to the fundamental problem of irrationality, the appearance of what Lukács referred to as the *hiatus irrationalem*, a dark area between subject and object which is perceived when the rational forms fail to comprehend the object, i.e. in a time of crisis. The genuinely rational response to the continuation of this problem in 'the age of reason' was to abandon the conception of form which was responsible for this discrepancy, to find a point of view from which it will not appear. For Heidegger, as for philosophical irrationalism in general, the appearance of this *hiatus* in crisis is the starting point for leading philosophy in the opposite direction: subject and object are resolutely held apart in order to analyse the subject in its own terms. What Heidegger is quite explicitly trying to do is to reverse the subject-object inversion which was the basis of the humanisation of the world, the basis of the Enlightenment and modern rationalism. He is attempting to destroy rationalism as such, not just bourgeois formal rationalism. When the phenomena are allowed to show themselves, without subordinating them to the categories of reason (formal or dialectical), we are again submitting to appearances and to

irrationalism in the mediaeval manner and the human is pushed out of the centre of the world, which is a return to the pre-Copernican position [40].

4. The argument which Lukács directs at relativism and nihilism in *History and Class Consciousness*, when applied to Heidegger, abruptly reduces his stature and restores a sense of proportion. He argues that relativism, logically thought through, always leads to a mythology or mysticism, and that this mysticism, however apparently profound, inevitably remains trapped within the framework of the rational systems from which it is trying to escape, and 'inevitably adopts the structure of the problem whose opacity had been the cause of its own birth'. It is simply 'the reproduction in imagination of the problem in its insolubility' and 'immediacy is merely reinstated on a higher level' [41]. This is why Heidegger relies so heavily on the psychology of 'striking obviousness', of radical astonishment, in *Being and Time*. The states of mind he describes are recognised because he is giving a merely heightened expression of the problems created by the development of crisis in the capitalist economy. In Heidegger's philosophy the problem, made explicit and magnified, is declared to be the answer [42]. From a *rational* point of view, we can see Heidegger's philosophy as a continuous circle of abstractions, held outside of the real, alternating between the world of 'rationalist' illusions (reification) and the disintegration of these illusions, inducing a wave of severe hallucinations. It is ultimately impressive only because of the power of its language.

5. Generally speaking, then, the intellectual phenomenon of irrationalism can be historically and hence objectively explained in terms of the three-way tension which was indicated at the beginning of this section. A consciousness which recognises only the rationality of its own forms and equates them with reason as such, can only see it as a *two-way* struggle between reason and its enemies. From a dialectical point of view it is seen as a *three-way* struggle between the increasingly unconvincing defence of the old existing order, the elements of disintegration of this order, and the attempts to find the emerging order. Or in the terms of this analysis: a struggle between the defence of a constricted formal rationalism disguised as the expression of universal reason; the reversal to irrationalism exploiting the hidden but increasingly visible weaknesses of this formal system; and the emergence of a more expansive and realistic rationalism. It should be clear from the analysis to this point that there is a pronounced *qualitative* distinction between these three 'forces'. It should also be clear that Heidegger is an unambiguous and explicit advocate of the second of these forces.

It is only of *secondary* importance to establish the subjective motivation behind individual representations of reality, whether political, philosophical or scientific [43]. The fundamental question relates to the objective significance of these representations. On the assumption that it is not always or even usually wilful, Lukács constantly exposes the resort to irrationalism in all its forms as either an intellectual failure or a failure of nerve in the face of the irruption of irrationality in a time of crisis. In his 'intransigent' critiques of irrationalism, what Lukács is trying to do is to lay bare the objective consequences of a choice of certain possibilities, of the adoption of certain points of view from which to look at the social and natural world. From his point of view - a commitment to the expansion of rationalism and the deepening of realism - the resort to irrationalist despair (whether or not the response is one of 'fortitude' or 'resolution') is only a

symptom of a submission to the apparent inexplicability and disintegration of the social and natural world, induced by the experience of crisis in every area of social life.

Irrationalism and fascism

The criticisms of Heidegger's philosophy which emerge from a close analysis, from a clear indication of its direction and its deeply reactionary nature suggest not that it should be repressed by being quietly ignored, but rather that it is essential to attempt this clarification. It is not difficult to show the connection between a clearly described expression of irrationalism with its fascist political counterpart, even if this connection opens up many ambiguities.

It is true but not particularly profound to point out that the atmosphere of despair in which irrationalism is grounded - whether or not this despair is disguised as a 'celebration' of flux and chaos - is equivalent to the social despair which created the conditions for the initial establishment of fascist governments. While it is indeed true that widely-read expressions of irrationalism help to create a 'congenial atmosphere' for fascist propaganda, we are in danger here of naively suggesting that an intellectual 'conspiracy' was responsible for undermining popular confidence in reason. To attribute *causal* responsibility to intellectuals such as Nietzsche or Heidegger for the genesis of fascism only provokes yet another furious and superficial round of debate over such issues as their 'fascist-sounding' language.

It is one of the principal features of a dialectical methodology that the idea of causal connections must give way to an entirely different concept of connection. It is the very idea of causal connection, not that of necessary connection, which is the central theoretical pillar of formal rationalism. It is not only Lukács who has repeatedly insisted that the perception of causal links between things establishes only an *external* and illusory connection, and thereby a distortion of the real movement of which they are integral parts. He is one of the few Marxist philosophers, however, who has consistently gone beyond a formal acknowledgement of this necessity. It is not a question of replacing 'simplistic' with 'complex' notions of cause, but rather a question of establishing the real *internal* connections in historical development.

In assessing the objective significance of Heidegger's philosophy, it must be understood as a whole, not as a collection of fragmented insights. His response to the crisis of subjectivity is only apparently contradictory, but these contradictions can be resolved by understanding his philosophy in terms of the internal development of European thought.

Its deeper connection with the political developments in the 1920s can only be clarified if we understand them as structurally analogous to philosophical developments, rather than as related in terms of cause and effect. The question of how accurately Rosenberg read Nietzsche or Heidegger is quite irrelevant. The essentially three-way conflict of intellectual attitudes to the problem of the irrational is structurally analogous to the essential conflicts between the various conservative and social-democratic defences of capitalism, the unsuccessful fascist assault on capitalism and the entire bourgeois democratic culture, and the genuinely revolutionary movement to transform the mode of production and establish a higher order of reason. The ambiguous relationship in which irrationalism stands to rationalism is expressed in its struggle to undermine 'the tyranny of reason' as such: in attacking reason it either inadvertently strengthens its formal version or threatens the collapse of reason altogether, in both cases obscuring a wider rationality which is the basis of a genuine solution to the problem of irrationality.

A concluding comment

It would clearly require more detailed evidence to substantiate the theses which I have put forward in this article, in particular the claim that Heidegger's philosophy is intrinsically connected with fascism. I have only touched on the central themes of both Lukács and Heidegger for the sake of presenting an overview of the conflict between them. In order to even perceive the real nature of this conflict we have to break down the myth of the 'late' Lukács 'betraying' the 'early' Lukács. The idea that an essentially subjective perspective was abandoned in a capitulation to a shallow (Stalinist) objectivity is a travesty which weighs like a millstone on any efforts to interpret Lukács objectively. This fixed interpretation has unfortunately been reinforced by the most recent publications on Lukács [44]. It is exactly analogous to the argument that Marx 'betrayed' himself in writing *Capital*.

The argument that Heidegger's philosophy should be understood, not as an unorthodox theology, but rather as the most developed expression of the self-searching and profound relativism of the early modernist period, enables us to understand not only the initial atheistic power of his philosophy, but also Lukács' demonstration that Marxist philosophy, in continuously speaking from a higher, genuinely rational point of view, is more *comprehensive* than the distorted viewpoint of relativism.

Bibliography

- Goldmann, Lucien, *Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy*, RKP, 1977
Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1972
Jameson, Fredric, *Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979
Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Macmillan, 1979
Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, Merlin Press, 1971
Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*, Merlin Press, 1980
Mann, Thomas, *The Magic Mountain*, Penguin Books, 1960
Marx, Karl, *Capital*, Lawrence and Wishart, 1954
Poster, Mark, *Existentialism in Post-War France: from Sartre to Althusser*, Princeton University Press, 1975
Sartre, J.-P., *Being and Nothingness*, Methuen, 1958
Stern, J.P., *Nietzsche*, Fontana, 1978

Footnotes

- 1 Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*.
- 2 See Poster, *Existentialism in Post-War France*, for a critical survey of these attempted syntheses.
- 3 See J.P. Stern, *Nietzsche*, as a recent example of such prevarication.
- 4 See especially Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*.
- 5 Weber's influence on Lukács has been greatly exaggerated. Lukács draws

- extensively on the insights of Weber, Simmel, Toennies and others, but is unambiguous in regarding them as essentially bourgeois.
- 6 This is not to suggest that there was no confusion in the way in which Lukács presented his argument at this stage, nor that it was entirely free of contradiction. As I hope will become clear from this article, some confusion was inevitable in the circumstances, and the contradictions are either apparent or peripheral.
 - 7 Although this was largely on political grounds, Lukács' position was profoundly misunderstood - as it also has been in many Western Marxist circles - as philosophical *relativism*.
 - 8 It should go without saying that this intellectual process is regarded as an essential component of the practical revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. Lukács is not shifting the emphasis from 'action' to 'consciousness', but on the contrary is stating the conditions in which they can be brought together.
 - 9 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat'.
 - 10 See especially HCC, pp.83-110.
 - 11 HCC, especially pp.161-72.
 - 12 He is also emphasising the inevitability of this failure, unless the standpoint of formal rationalism is transcended.
 - 13 HCC, p.92.
 - 14 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.487. Lukács does in fact answer these questions

with considerably more historical precision than Heidegger, who is more concerned with proving that reification is the permanent structure of the human mind. That not only this question but the whole book was largely conceived as a response to Lukács has been convincingly demonstrated by Goldmann, in *Lukács and Heidegger*. But, as Lukács has himself pointed out, Heidegger's philosophy as a whole is an implicit critique of Marxist philosophy as such.

15 *Radical Philosophy*, Nos.25-27.

16 It would, however, be as logical to argue, for example, that Popper's pre-occupation with Marxism shows that he was a communist.

17 I am not for a moment suggesting that this was what Waterhouse intended; but I am sure he would agree that this attitude towards existentialism in particular is not an uncommon one.

18 See, for example, *BT*, p.320.

19 *BT*, pp.63-64.

20 *BT*, p.164.

Philosophy and Social Work: The Legitimation of a Professional Ideology

D. J. Clifford

Introduction

In the 19th century there were close links between philosophy and social work. The moral social and political issues that arise in social work were of vital concern to British neo-idealists, and social work as a profession owes much to the influence of these philosophers at its foundation. However, social work soon lost its interest for philosophy, until in the last two decades British analytical philosophers have started to pay it some attention once again. Unfortunately, the interest that has been paid so far has not been very beneficial. Often it has been a rather distant, patronising interest as expressed in the view that '... so long as philosophy and philosophers remain withdrawn from the substantive issues (of social work), it is inevitable that ideology should flourish' [1], as if philosophy itself were an indubitably objective and neutral tool of analysis. This paper will argue that not only have recent philosophical contributions not been neutral, they have positively helped to reconstruct and sustain ideological values in the social work profession.

Values in social work

As social work is commonly regarded as a liberal semi-profession, it is not surprising to find liberal values reflected in its literature. It is a frequent assertion that social work ideas reflect the values '... held to be central to the existence of Western liberal democratic society, and to Britain in particular' [2], and these include above all '... the primary importance of the individual', and '... a parliamentary democratic system of government' [3]. Like J.S. Mill, liberal social work values are concerned with simultaneously protecting the freedom of the individual, and also allowing for the morally important influence of the community to exert, in some degree and in some respects, its effect on individual character. The liberalism underlying social work illustrates this moral concern with individual action in the context of a participatory democratic society. The moral attitude is more fundamental than a specific political commitment, and is

compatible with a variety of political views. It is the *moral* concern with both the individual and society which legitimates a type of interventive activity aiming to balance the interests of the individual, and the interests of others to their ultimate mutual benefit, as expressed in the British Association of Social Work's code of ethics: 'The profession accepts responsibility to encourage and facilitate the self-realisation of the individual person with *due regard for the interests of others*.' [4]

Some social work authors ignore the question of values, taking a 'scientific', medical or practical orientation towards their subject matter - and usually committing themselves to broad liberal values by default. However, many social work texts, facing the pressing moral and political dilemmas of social work practice, do make explicit reference to values. It is the formulation of a largely forgotten philosopher of social work, E.C. Lindeman, which became the basis for expressing liberal values in many social work texts. He was a teacher at the New York School of Social Work from 1924 to 1950 and was deeply influenced by Dewey. His work has been studied, utilized and popularised by G. Kenopka, whose book on group work refers to Lindemann's '... distinction between *primary* and *secondary* values, the first ones representing basic ethical demands, and the latter ones growing out of cultural mores which change in time and place' [5]. She argues that 'The clear acceptance of primary values, and the demand of honest investigation into the social worker's own value system are basic to social group work practice' [6]. She identifies these primary values by saying that 'The key values of social work are ethical ones since they concern themselves with interpersonal relations. They are: "justice", and "responsibility", combined with "mental health".' [7]

The importance of this distinction and of the identification of primary values in social work is in the assumptions that these values are: (1) basic (i.e. universal, and not a subject of political and social debate); and (2) moral (since they 'concern themselves with interpersonal relations' at an individual level). These 'basic', 'moral' values thus underlie other social or political values. The